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Generic advertising without supply control:
implications of funding mechanisms for
advertising intensities in competitive industries
{
John W. Freebairn and Julian M. Alston*
Producer pro¢t-maximising rules for generic commodity advertising programs and
associated funding levies are derived. Lump-sum, per unit and ad valorem levies,
and government subsidy funding arrangements are compared and contrasted. The
initial single-product competitive market model is extended to incorporate inter-
national trade, government price policies, and multiple commodity interactions.
1. Introduction
Generic commodity advertising programs are an important feature of
Australian agriculture (IAC 1976) and of agriculture in other countries (in
the United States, for example, Forker and Ward (1993), and Vande Kamp
and Kaiser (1999), estimate annual expenditure at over US$1 billion). Many
commodities have some generic advertising (especially livestock products,
including dairy, meats, wool and eggs, and tree crops such as apples, citrus,
and various nuts). For some commodities, producer levies to fund generic
advertising have been as high as 2 per cent of gross sales, and in some cases,
especially where exports are involved, governments have provided matching
grants. This article reviews and extends models for determining generic
advertising expenditure, and associated producer levy rates, that would
maximise net returns or pro¢ts to commodity producers, and clari¢es the
e¡ects of di¡erences in funding mechanisms and market situations on the
producer optimum.
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1No assessment is made about the more controversial implications of advertising for the
welfare of buyers and of society.There is a very large literature on modelling the choice of pro¢t-maximising
advertising. Most of the industrial organisation literature in this area
considers the case of ¢rms with market power, including monopoly, oligopoly
and monopolistic competition, where ¢rms have control over supply as well
as advertising. In the context of generic advertising of agricultural com-
modities, our interest is with ¢rms acting as price takers, and the advertising
choice takes a competitive supply response as beyond the control of the
organisation in charge of the advertising and other promotional decisions.
Models of generic advertising also vary in terms of their treatment of the
source of funding. Here we distinguish between whether the funds are
regarded as a lump-sum charge, as was initially studied by Nerlove and
Waugh (1961) and more recently by Goddard and McCutcheon (1993), or
collected as a levy. We draw a further distinction between a speci¢c (per unit)
levy and a percentage (ad valorem) levy. IAC (1976), De Boer (1997) and
Chang and Kinnucan (1991) present diagrams to represent a model of levy-
based promotion, and Alston et al. (1994), Alston et al. (1998), and
Kinnucan (1999a, b) provide more formal analyses. In addition, we evaluate
the case where the government provides a grant to supplement the producer
levy (see also Kinnucan and Christian 1997). Not surprisingly, the source of
funds a¡ects the pro¢t-maximising level of generic advertising and levy
rates.
Most of the reported models consider the case of a closed economy or
non-traded commodity. Kinnucan (1999a) and Cran¢eld and Goddard
(1999) speci¢cally allow for trade, and this is a more realistic framework for
consideration of generic advertising for most agricultural commodities in
most countries, including Australia. As we show, recognition of the export
or import status of an agricultural commodity in£uences the producer pro¢t-
maximising level of generic advertising
A number of other model extensions to capture greater realism have been
considered. These include explicit allowance for the e¡ects of policy inter-
ventions, for example, Goddard and Tielu (1988) and Kinnucan (1999b), and
multi-stage production systems, for example, Wohlgenant (1993). Of recent
interest, and with likely important implications, are multi-product models
that recognise a number of cross-product e¡ects of generic advertising
£owing from one product to another. Here the studies by Piggott et al.
(1995), Hill et al. (1996), Kinnucan (1996) and Kinnucan and Miao (2000)
point to the di¡erent cross-product price and advertising e¡ects in£uencing
producer returns, but they do not formally derive pro¢t-maximising levels of
generic advertising and associated levy rates.
In this article we synthesise these various elements within a uni¢ed frame-
work to show the di¡erences in results for producer's optimal advertising
expenditures, with di¡erent funding mechanisms, and under a range of
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Diagrams and algebra are used to derive pro¢t-maximising advertising
strategies. Initially, we consider a single commodity, closed economy, with
no government intervention. For this case we derive producer pro¢t-
maximising advertising and levy rates for the cases of lump-sum funding,
and funding by per unit and ad valorem levies; and, in the case of a per unit
levy, we allow for a matching government subsidy. The next section adds
an international dimension, with most of the emphasis on an export
commodity. Then we compare and contrast the marginal conditions and
elasticity rules for the producer pro¢t-maximising advertising levels and levy
rates derived under the di¡erent funding options and trade status. We
illustrate how government policy interventions can be incorporated into the
models and how they can alter producer pro¢t-maximising choices. Then we
note some of the likely implications of taking into account multiple-product
interactions as they a¡ect producer pro¢t-maximising generic commodity
advertising strategies, and suggest further directions of analysis. Finally we
discuss some implications of our analysis for the speci¢cation of econometric
models of the demand response to advertising and summarise the main
¢ndings.
2. Profit-maximising advertising in a closed economy
We begin with a single-market model of supply, demand, and market
equilibrium for a commodity, say, wool or bananas, and then we specify
special features for the di¡erent options to fund advertising expenditure.
Functions for demand, supply and market clearance speci¢ed at the farm
level are given by:
2
Q
d  fP;A;Zd 1
Q




where Q is quantity supplied and demanded, P is buyer price, Pp is producer
price, A is the advertising expenditure,
3 and Zd and Zs are demand and
supply curve shift variables (which are ignored in the remainder of the
2The demand function at the farm level can be considered a derived demand taking into
account retail demand and the farm-to-retail marketing activities of transport, storage,
processing, and distribution.
3In this article we take A to measure the opportunity cost of funds. This means we can
drop the r term found initially in Nerlove and Waugh (1961) and some subsequent work.
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@Q
d=@A > 0, and it may reduce (or increase) the elasticity of demand, that is
@
2Q
d=@P@A > or < 0.
The way in which the advertising is funded in£uences the producer
pro¢t-maximising expenditure on advertising, because it in£uences the share
of advertising costs ultimately borne by the producers. Under a lump-sum
funding arrangement, producers both pay and bear all the ¢nal economic
incidence of the costs of advertising, and the net producer price is the market
price Pp  P. In the case of a per unit (¢xed, or speci¢c) levy, for example,
$T per kilogram of wool or bananas, advertising expenditure is equal to the
levy times output A  T Q, but some of the economic costs are passed on
to consumers, and the net producer price is the market price minus the levy
Pp  P ÿ T . With an ad valorem levy at a rate t, for example, t  100 per
cent of the value of wool or banana sales, advertising expenditure is equal to
the levy times the value of sales A  tPQ, and the net producer price is a
fraction 1 ÿ t of the market price Pp  1 ÿ tP. Finally, when the
government provides a subsidy, for example, $x per $ of producer funds
raised by a levy collected from growers, the advertising expenditure is greater
than both the levy revenue and the producer cost.
In all the cases below, both the advertising expenditure and the associated
levy rate, if relevant, are chosen to maximise producer pro¢t or quasi-rent.
Pro¢t, p, is
p  PQ ÿ T V C ÿ A 4
where P and Q are price and quantity determined by market equilibrium of
equations (1), (2) and (3), A is advertising expenditure from producer funds
raised by commodity levies or lump-sum assessments, and T V C is total
variable cost, or the integral of the competitive supply curve in equation (2)
so that:




(Implicitly we assume the absence of avoidable ¢xed costs or no change in
avoidable ¢xed costs when we measure changes in pro¢t as changes in
producer surplus.) In the model solutions below we use the converse result
that dT V C=dQ  MC (where MC is marginal cost), and under competitive
behaviour producers choose output to equate MC and Pp, so that MC
corresponds to the supply curve, given by equation (2). With this model
framework, we consider the pro¢t-maximising advertising expenditure, A,
and levy rates T and t if relevant, in turn for each of the advertising funding
options.
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Nerlove and Waugh (1961) ¢rst developed the optimal rule for advertising
given lump-sum funding. Figure 1 illustrates the story. Initially, D0 is
demand, S0 is supply, P0 and Q0 are the market-clearing price and quantity,
and area aP0e is producer surplus or industry pro¢t.
An increase in e¡ective advertising (by dA) shifts the demand curve out.
One perspective shown in ¢gure 1 is a parallel outwards shift to D1, with
ef  @Q=@AdA. The new equilibrium is at price P1 and quantity Q1, and
gross producer surplus increases by area P0P1ge. Alternatively, advertising
also may make demand less elastic, say, shifting the demand curve from D0
to D2 (passing through point f). Note that, in comparing the shift of demand
to D2 rather than D1, a case where demand becomes more inelastic as well
as the curve shifting outwards, the new equilibrium at h is at a higher price
and quantity, with a larger increase in gross producer surplus. If the supply
curve at some time in the future were to shift downwards, say, because of
R&D, a more inelastic demand might mean lower producer surplus in time,
as was pointed out by Quilkey (1986). For completeness, we could consider
other advertising strategies that shift demand out, but not as far as point f,
and make it less elastic, with the new price-quantity equilibrium outcome
Figure 1 Lump sum funding model
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elastic demand curve.
Intuitively, the pro¢t-maximising advertising expenditure would be that
amount where the marginal gross bene¢t from additional advertising, given
by dP=dAQ, equals the marginal cost of advertising, which is one
dA=dA  1. An expression for the pro¢t-maximising lump-sum expenditure
on advertising can be derived more formally by solving for the value of A
that will maximise pro¢t p in equation (4) subject to equations (1), (2) and














Now, expanding dT V C=dA  dT V C=dQdQ=dA, recognising that
dT V C=dQ  MC  P, the ¢rst and third right-hand terms of equation (6)






In equation (7), the left-hand side represents the marginal revenue gain from
more advertising, and the right-hand side is the marginal cost of a dollar
increase in the lump-sum advertising budget.
An expression for dP=dA in equation (7) can be obtained by taking total
derivatives of the market demand and supply curves (1) and (2) and equating
them via equation (3).
5 After substituting for dP=dA in equation (7), and











which can be used to ¢nd the optimal value for A, given the marginal e¡ect
of advertising on demand, @f=@A, and the price slopes of demand and supply,









4For simplicity we assume an interior solution. As noted by a referee, in some cases the
optimum solution will be a corner solution of zero advertising. An implicit assumption when
we say that we have found a maximum is that the marginal return from the advertising is
downward sloping (i.e., that @
2Q=@A
2 < 0) which means that the advertising elasticity is
positive but less than one (i.e., 0 < @Q=@AA=Q < 1).
5Full details of the derivation of these and other formulae are available from the
authors.
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advertising, Z  ÿ@f=@PP=Q is the absolute value of the own-price
elasticity of demand (i.e., Z > 0), e  @g=@PP=Q is the elasticity of supply,
and f
L S  A=PQ is the pro¢t-maximising advertising intensity (advertising
expenditure as a share of total revenue), with all elasticities measured at the
pro¢t-maximising equilibrium point. Equation (9) is the Nerlove^Waugh rule
for choosing a pro¢t-maximising, lump-sum advertising budget.
2.2 Per unit levy funding
In most cases generic advertising of agricultural products is funded by a levy
on output collected from producers (or the ¢rst handler of a farm product),
either a ¢xed (or per unit quantity) levy, or an ad valorem levy. Figure 2
illustrates the situation for a ¢xed levy. As for ¢gure 1, in ¢gure 2, in the
initial situation, D0 is demand, S0 is supply, P0 and Q0 are the market-
clearing price and quantity, and area aP0e is producer surplus or industry
pro¢t.
Collection of a levy, which is used to fund generic advertising, can be
analysed as a shift of both the demand curve and the supply curve.
Advertising, as before, shifts demand outwards to D1. At the same time, the
Figure 2 Per unit levy funding
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the supply curve upwards by the amount of the levy to S1. A new equilibrium
is established with a higher price and quantity, at P1 and Q1, respectively.
Producer surplus becomes area bP1g akm. The net gain in producer
surplus is bP1g ÿ aP0e, or area P0mke. The levy will increase so long as the
additional sales revenue gained exceeds the extra levy costs and the increased
costs of production associated with greater output. At the optimum, the
vertical increase in demand (from a marginal increase in advertising) just
balances the vertical shift in supply (from an increase in the levy to ¢nance
the marginal increase in advertising) so that the quantity produced and
consumed, and producer surplus, do not change (i.e., dP=dA  dP=dT and
dQ=dT  0).
We wish to derive an expression for the levy, T (and the associated
advertising expenditure, A, that will maximise p in equation (4) given
equations (1), (2), and (3), and subject to the constraints that advertising
expenditure is equal to the amount of revenue raised by the levy (i.e.,
A  T Q) and that net producer price is Pp  P ÿ T . To do this, we
substitute for A  T Q in equation (4), take the derivative of p with respect

















Then, using dT V C=dT  dT V C=dQ dQ=dT , and recognising that
dT V C=dQ  Pp  P ÿ T , the ¢rst, third, and last terms on the right-hand









In equation (11), the left-hand side QdP=dT  is the marginal gain in revenue
from extra advertising funded by an incremental increase in the levy, and
the right-hand side Q is the marginal cost of an increase in the levy. At the
maximum, a marginal increase in the levy to fund advertising increases
marginal cost by the same amount as the extra advertising in shifting out
demand increases price, and hence dQ=dT  0, and producer surplus (or
pro¢t) is unchanged.
To obtain an expression for dP=dT in equation (11), we take the total
derivatives of the market demand and supply curves (1) and (2), recognising
that PP  P ÿ T and A  T Q, and equate them using the market clearing
identity (3). After substituting the resulting expression for dP=dT in (11),
and cancelling some terms, we obtain:
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Further manipulation of equation (12) to obtain elasticities leads to the













PU is the optimal advertising intensity funded by a per unit levy,
T =P is the levy as a proportion of the market price, and, as before, a is the
advertising elasticity and Z is the absolute value of the demand price
elasticity.
Note that, coincidentally, equation (13) is the same as the Dorfman^
Steiner advertising rule, but it is derived for very di¡erent circumstances and
the parameters represent di¡erent forces. Dorfman and Steiner (1954)
considered the case of a price-maker who chooses production and advertising
to equate marginal cost and marginal revenue, with marginal revenue below
market price. Essentially, assuming a constant price and marginal cost (or,
less strongly, a constant margin of price less marginal cost) around the
pro¢t-maximising point, the seller's bene¢t from extra sales driven by
advertising (measured by the advertising elasticity), is equal to price less
marginal cost. For a monopolist, the margin of price minus marginal cost is
equal to price times the inverse of the demand elasticity. In contrast, the
context here is one of collective action in advertising by a set of price-taking
producers without supply control powers, such that production is chosen to
equate marginal cost with price, not the industry marginal revenue. At the
pro¢t-maximising advertising level and levy rate, quantity is constant, that
is, dQ=dT  0. The inverse of the demand elasticity is used to convert the
quantity-expansion e¡ect of advertising into a price-increase e¡ect, and it is
the price-increase e¡ect that determines the bene¢ts from generic advertising
for the industry with competitive producers.
2.3 Ad valorem levy funding
Compared with the per-unit levy, which causes a parallel shift upwards of
the supply curve, an ad valorem levy results in a proportional shift of the
supply curve, but otherwise the story is similar. We wish to derive an
expression for the levy, t, that will maximise p in equation (4) given
equations (1), (2), (3), and subject to the constraints that advertising
expenditure is equal to the amount of revenue raised by the levy (i.e.,
A  tPQ) and that the producer price is given by Pp  P1 ÿ t. To do this,
we substitute for A in equation (4) and take the derivative of p with respect
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 0  Q1 ÿ t
dP
dt







Expanding the second last right-hand term ö using dT V C=dt 
dT V C=dQdQ=dt  P1 ÿ tdQ=dt ö the ¢rst-order condition from







To obtain an expression for dP=dt in equation (15) involves taking total
derivatives of the demand and supply equations (1) and (2), and using
A  tPQ and Pp  1 ÿ tP. Substituting for dP=dt in equation (15), the ¢rst-







which can be expressed in terms of the pro¢t-maximising advertising










AV is the optimal advertising intensity funded by an ad valorem levy, t,
and all the terms are as de¢ned above. Note that the producers' optimal levy is
the same, regardless of whether it is speci¢ed as per unit or ad valorem, which
canbeseenbynotingthatt  T =Pandcomparingequations(13)and(17).
2.4 Government subsidy for promotion
In some cases governments top up or provide a matching grant for
industry-provided funds for advertising, e¡ectively an advertising subsidy.
For example, in Australia prior to 1993^94, producer wool promotion levies
were matched dollar for dollar, and in Japan governments contribute to the
generic advertising of £uid milk (Suzuki et al. 1994). In the United States,
subsidies have applied for export promotion under the Temporary Export
Assistance (TEA) program, established under the 1985 farm bill, and the
Market Promotion Program (MPP) established under the 1990 farm bill.
6
6Ackerman and Henneberry (1992) discuss the programs, and various papers in Nichols
et al. (1991), for example, provide more speci¢c analysis of US export promotion programs
with support from the TEA program. Vande Kamp and Kaiser (1999) provide more recent
data.
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a per unit or ad valorem rate. Here, we consider an alternative case where
the government provides a matching grant in proportion to the amount
raised by a per unit levy, raising the advertising budget from A  T Q to
A  1  xT
MQ where x is the proportion of the budget provided by the
government, and the superscript M denotes that this levy rate will di¡er from
the one derived in the absence of the matching funds.
7 In essence, the pro-
ducer cost per dollar of advertising is reduced from one dollar to 1=1  x
dollars; alternatively, advertising generates a larger demand expansion per
dollar of producer levy.
We follow the procedures for deriving the pro¢t-maximising levy T from
the section `Per unit levy funding' above. The pro¢t-maximising amount of
advertising is given by similar ¢rst-order conditions as in the absence of the
matching support ö i.e., dQ=dT
M  0, and dP=dT
M  1. The marginal














1  x 
a
Z
1  x: 19









where, as before, T
M is the levy per unit collected from producers, a is the
elasticity of demand with respect to advertising, and Z is the absolute value
of the price elasticity of demand. However, now these elasticities are de¢ned
for the equilibrium with a matching grant, which means a higher advertising
intensity, f
M  1  xa=Z, given a higher advertising expenditure, A
M 
1  xT
MQ, which is funded partly by the levy and partly by the government
subsidy, x.
The levy rate T in equation (13) without the government subsidy (or with
x  0) can be compared with the levy rate T
M in equation (20) with a subsidy
(or with x > 0). For a common demand elasticity (i.e., Z  Z
M), the optimal
7Alternatively, the subsidy could be represented as T  X. Similarly, for an ad valorem
industry levy t, the subsidy could be represented as t1  x or as tP  X. Likewise,
government subsidies could be used to augment producer lump-sum funding of generic
advertising.
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M=P implied by the matching grant is greater than (less than)
the levy rate with no matching grant T =P if the advertising elasticity with
the matching grant, a
M, is greater than (less than) the advertising elasticity
with no matching grant, a. With a larger total advertising budget, that is,
A
M  T
M1  xQ > T Q  A, given diminishing marginal returns, the
marginal return to advertising in the pro¢t-maximising area is lower, that is
@
2Q=@
2A < 0, a result broadly found in the quantitative literature when
allowed (Lambin 1976, and Forker and Ward 1993) and a result required to
meet second-order conditions for pro¢t maximisation. Even though the
advertising intensity is higher f
M > f, if the advertising elasticity, a, is a
declining function of the amount of advertising, then, a
M < a. In turn, this
means that the introduction of a matching government grant implies a lower
pro¢t-maximising producer levy rate, but a higher total advertising
expenditure, and these e¡ects will be larger, the larger is the subsidy, x.
Whether the government grant crowds out producer spending to the extent
of reducing total levy revenue is less clear, since the lower rate of levy is
applied to a larger total value of sales revenue.
3. International trade
The single-market model might be regarded as a closed economy, or non-
traded product model. In reality, most agricultural commodities are traded
internationally. For export goods, the analysis must distinguish between
advertising that applies only to the domestic market, only to the export
market, or to both. And care must be given to the de¢nition of the tax base for
collecting levies to fund the advertising. Both the target market and the levy
base will in£uence the answer. Also of interest is the comparison of pro¢t-
maximising advertising and levy rates based on a closed-economy model when
the commodity is actually traded. Kinnucan (1999a), Cran¢eld and Goddard
(1999), and Kinnucan and Myrland (2000) have developed models where the
advertised commodities are exported or imported. To illustrate some key
implications of explicit recognition of international commodity trade, in this
section we extend the model to encompass both export sales and domestic
sales, and derive producer pro¢t-maximising rules for a per unit levy on total
production to fund advertising on the domestic market.
Figure 3 illustrates the case for a homogeneous product sold domestically
and exported. For simplicity, free trade is assumed and transport costs are
ignored. Then, the same producer and buyer prices apply for domestic and
export sales. Before advertising, domestic demand is D
d
0, export demand is
D
e




0. With initial supply S0, market









initial producer surplus is area aP0e.
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1Now, suppose a levy, T , is collected on all sales, Q, to provide advertising
funds, A
d  T Q, which are used to promote domestic sales. The domestic
demand shifts out to D
d
1, export demand does not change, and total demand




0. The levy shifts the supply curve upwards to
S1  S0  T . The new equilibrium price is P1, domestic sales rise to Q
d
1,
export sales fall to Q
e
1 and total sales rise to Q1. Producer surplus rises by
P0mke, as was the case in ¢gure 2 where, for convenience, the same notation
has been used for ¢gure 2 and the third panel of ¢gure 3, representing the
total market.
Focusing on the third panel of ¢gure 3, and analogous to the discussion
in section 2 and ¢gure 2, the levy T should be raised to fund advertising on
the domestic market to the point where the marginal bene¢t to producers
from the advertising-induced increase in price QdP=dA
d is equal to the
marginal cost to producers of the levy QdT . This, in turn, gives the ¢rst-




This is the same form as equation (11), except we now interpret P as the
market price that clears domestic and export sales. An analogous set of
arguments could be made for using the levy to fund export promotion, or
more generally both domestic and export promotion.
A key result in both equation (11) for the non-traded good, and equation
(21) for the traded good, is that for advertising to be pro¢table in a com-
petitive industry (with upwards-sloping supply), it must induce an increase in
price. Indeed, since a levy of T per unit increases average costs by T per unit,
the resulting advertising expenditure must give rise to an increase in average
revenue of at least T per unit. The result in equations (11) and (21) is an
optimum since, at the margin, the increase in producer revenue is exactly
balanced by the increase in producer costs but, for inframarginal quantities
of advertising and levies, because of diminishing returns, the marginal bene¢t
exceeds the marginal cost.
A formal expression for dP=dT for equation (21) can be derived from the




d  T Q 22
Q
e  feP; 23
Q  gPp;where Pp  P ÿ T 24
Q
d  Q
e  Q 25
where equation (22) is the domestic demand equation with domestic
advertising equal to A
d, equation (23) is the export demand equation,
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clearing identity. Taking total derivations of equations (22) to (24), and using
equation (25), an expression can be obtained for dP=dT .
After substituting the expression for dP=dT into equation (21), and some
further manipulation, the optimal advertising intensity for an export good,
f













d  1 ÿ wdZ
e 26
where wd denotes sales on the domestic market as a share of total sales
(i.e., the quantity share wd  Qd=Q or, equivalently, the value share





d is the elasticity of domestic demand
response to advertising, and Z
i  ÿdQ
i=dPP=Q
i is the absolute value of
the own-price elasticity of demand in market i (for i  d or e, representing
the domestic and export demands, respectively).
In equation (26), the pro¢t-maximising advertising intensity and levy rate
will be greater the larger is the sales response to advertising (the larger is a
d),
the less elastic is demand in both the advertised and non-advertised segments
(the smaller are Z
d and Z
e), and the more important is the advertised market
in total sales (the larger is wd). The same equations could be used to represent
export market advertising funded by a levy on all of production, simply by
reversing the roles of the two markets (i.e., switching the indexes, d and e in
the equations). Further, a model with both domestic and export advertising
could be represented, approximately, by simply adding the two components
together.
Further inspection of ¢gure 3 and equation (26) enables several obser-
vations to be drawn about pro¢t-maximising levels of advertising on either
the domestic or export markets. For the situation of a small-country
producer (in the sense that its export demand curve is perfectly elastic, or in
equation (26) Z
e  1), no amount of domestic advertising or export
advertising is worthwhile, with absent government intervention in the
commodity market. This is because, in such a case, no matter how e¡ective
advertising is in increasing the domestic demand, it cannot give rise to
increases in the domestic and world price. Policy interventions and other
forces that separate the markets and break the law of one price can alter this
story (as illustrated in ¢gure 4). However, in the absence of such inter-
ventions, it is unlikely to be pro¢table to promote domestic sales of
agricultural products that are also sold on export markets where the country
faces a highly elastic export demand. The same is true for goods that
compete with highly elastically supplied imports. For instance, in the
Australian citrus industry, the promotion of fresh oranges on the domestic
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Australia is a small country in the world market for orange juice, the main
e¡ect is likely to be a diversion of Australian oranges from processing to the
fresh market, with little if any impact on price or average revenue.
8 Even when
prices are not exogenous, in a multimarket setting arbitrage e¡ects will
dampen the price-enhancing e¡ects of advertising in one market segment,
diminishing the producer returns and optimal advertising expenditure relative
to what would be implied by a single-market analysis as shown above.
The results of this section can be used to choose levy rates to fund
advertising of domestic sales and export sales, or to allocate a given
advertising sum between the two markets.
9 Clearly, this type of analysis can
be extended in many ways. Examples include more than two market seg-
ments, or markets may be segmented by product type ö such as the various
dairy products and fruit products ö as well as geographically.
10 As before,
situations of lump-sum funding and of matching subsidies also could be
analysed. And, as shown in Kinnucan (1999a), these procedures can be
applied to a commodity that is imported.
4. Some comparisons
At this point it is useful to compare and contrast the rules derived for
producer pro¢t-maximising levels of advertising, and associated levy rates,
from the di¡erent models presented in the preceding two sections. Table 1
provides a summary of ¢rst-order conditions that are used to derive the
pro¢t-maximising levels of advertising, and of the advertising intensities
expressed as functions of elasticities at these optimum levels, for a number of
the models. The models di¡er with respect to assumptions about trade status
(i.e., non-traded versus export), and about funding options (i.e., lump sum,
per unit levy, ad valorem levy, and per unit levy with a matching government
8This fact did not prevent the citrus fruit marketing board from spending levy funds on
fresh citrus promotion in the 1980s, although, interestingly, the advertising intensity was
higher in the Riverina than in Melbourne.
9In a typical case where the export demand is relatively elastic, raising the price on both
markets through levy-funded export promotion has some elements in common with price
discrimination against the more inelastic domestic market. When the `promotion' means
price discounts rather than advertising, then the arrangement is in e¡ect an export subsidy
¢nanced by an output tax, and this is identical in e¡ect to a price discrimination and pooling
arrangement (e.g., see Alston and Freebairn 1988, for discussion). The same may be true if
the two markets are for di¡erent end-uses rather than di¡erent markets for the same end-
use.
10The conference volume edited by Nichols et al. (1991) is devoted to generic promotion
programs for agricultural exports. Also, see Goddard and Conboy (1993).
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in the derived pro¢t-maximising advertising levels and levy rates for the
di¡erent sets of assumption.
For the typical agricultural commodity production system, with many
competitive producers and no industry-wide supply control, advertising can
improve producer returns only if it results in an increase in market price.
Producers gain primarily from the higher price on existing sales, and to a lesser
extent from the increases in output. A number of factors in turn in£uence the
potential producer price-enhancing e¡ect of advertising. First, the more
e¡ective is advertising in increasing demand at any price, ceteris paribus, the
larger will be the price gain and the pro¢t-maximising advertising intensity. In
all cases, the optimal advertising intensity increases with the advertising
elasticity, a. Second, elasticities of demand and supply determine the price-
increasing e¡ect of both advertising-induced increases in demand and levies to
fund the advertising. In particular, when demand is less elastic, a given demand
Table 1 Profit-maximising advertising rules: effects of funding methods and trade status
Funding method Expenditure
First-order
conditions Advertising intensity and levy rate
Closed economy
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Source: Derived from text. P is price, Q is quantity, A is total advertising expenditure, T is the per unit
levy, t is the ad valorem levy, and x is the matching government subsidy. For the closed economy, a is
the elasticity of demand with respect to the advertising expenditure, Z is the absolute value of the price
elasticity of demand, e is the price elasticity of supply, and the M superscript distinguishes the matching
government subsidy case. For the export market case with advertising of domestic sales, wd is the share
of the product sold domestically, a
d is the advertising elasticity for domestic sales, and Z
d and Z
e are
the absolute values of the price elasticities of demand for domestic and export sales, respectively.
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and thus, everything else equal, the advertising is more pro¢table for producers.
Hence, in table 1, for a nontraded commodity the advertising intensity is
inverselyrelatedtotheabsolutevalueoftheelasticityofdemand, Z.
For an export commodity, we can see that the result for the overall
advertising intensity is equivalent, given that the overall elasticity of demand
is equal to the share-weighted sum of the domestic and export market
elasticities of demand, i.e., Z  wdZ
d  1 ÿ wdZ
e. Hence, the optimal levy
rate decreases with increases in either the elasticity of demand in the market
where the advertising applies, or the elasticity of demand in the other market
for the good. Further, if the export demand is relatively elastic (as is the
typical case), the optimal levy rate increases with an increase in the domestic
market share (because this means a less elastic overall demand). In the
extreme case of a small country Z
e  1, or even in a less-extreme case of
heavy dependence on export sales and a relatively elastic export demand (wd
is small and Z
e is large), little is to be gained by advertising domestic sales.
The supply elasticity directly a¡ects the optimal amount of advertising
only for the lump-sum funding model. Regardless of the funding arrange-
ments, a more-elastic supply function implies a smaller price increase and
smaller bene¢ts to producers from a given advertising-induced demand shift.
With levy funding, however, an increase in the supply elasticity implies
changes in the producer costs of a given advertising expenditure along with
the changes in the producer bene¢ts. The supply elasticity drops out of the
advertising intensity formulae because, at the pro¢t-maximising margin, the
advertising-induced price increase just o¡sets the increase in marginal cost
from the higher levy associated with the increased advertising. More
generally, for inframarginal advertising levels, the less elastic is supply the
greater will be the net price increase and increase in producer quasi-rents
resulting from the levy and advertising.
An interesting result in table 1 is that there is essentially no di¡erence
between an ad valorem levy and a per unit levy. At the pro¢t-maximising
level of advertising, an ad valorem levy, t, is readily transformed to an
equivalent per unit levy, T , and vice versa, using t  T =P and T  tP, where
P is price. Hence, the elasticity rules for the optimum advertising intensity
are equivalent for the two types of levy.
11 However, this similarity is a long-
run or average outcome. Shifts in demand and supply curves from year to
11This result, in particular, rests on the maintained assumption of competition. If, for
instance, processors were oligopsonistic, there might be signi¢cant di¡erences in impli-
cations of per unit versus ad valorem levies for the distribution of the costs of the levy and
thus for the producers' optimum. Zhang and Sexton (2000) have compared lump-sum and
per unit levies to fund advertising with imperfectly competitive middlemen.
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business cycle, may mean that constant values for t and T over time would
mean di¡erent patterns of annual advertising expenditures ö the particular
value for t that is equivalent to a given value of T will vary from year to year
because of variations of price, P, and may be hard to determine ex ante.
12
There are fundamental di¡erences between the producer pro¢t-maximising
advertising expenditure when comparing lump-sum funding and levy
funding. Interestingly, more advertising is pro¢table with levy funding.
13
This arises because both the statutory and ¢nal costs of lump-sum funding
are borne entirely by producers, whereas levy funding shifts the marginal
cost and supply curve upwards, and as a result some of the levy costs are
passed on to buyers. The more elastic is product supply or product demand,
the smaller is the price-increasing e¡ect of lump-sum funded advertising,
and hence the smaller is the pro¢t-maximising advertising expenditure.
A comparison of the formulae in table 1 for a closed economy model
and for an export model provides salutary warnings about applying the
closed economy model to derive pro¢t-maximising advertising and levy rates
when the commodity of interest is traded. The formula for the levy rate on
production to fund advertising of domestic sales of a good that is also
exported is still equal to the overall demand elasticity with respect to
advertising divided by the overall elasticity of demand with respect to price.
But these elasticities depend on market shares and price elasticities on the
di¡erent markets. To just apply elasticities for the domestic market would
lead to an over-investment in domestic advertising, and the more so the more
important the export market and the more elastic export demand.
5. Policy interventions
In many parts of the world, and still in some industries in Australia,
agriculture is subject to government policy interventions a¡ecting farm
12In addition, if industry gross revenues are more stable than aggregate quantities
(because of downward-sloping demand and supply variability being the main source of
variability in prices and quantities), an ad valorem levy is likely to generate a more stable
stream of revenues to fund promotion expenditures. Also, a constant per unit levy implies
di¡erent percentage tax rates applying to di¡erent qualities of the same good at a point in
time, which will distort the quality mix and implies some inequities. In spite of these
apparent advantages of ad valorem levies, per unit levies are widely used. One possible
explanation is that per unit taxes might involve lower collection costs or less potential for
tax evasion; obligations under an ad valorem tax can be reduced by under-reporting the
value, for instance.
13This point is noted by Goddard and McCutcheon (1993) and explained more clearly
in the elaboration by Kinnucan (1999a).
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goods can take the form of import restrictions via tari¡s, quotas and
phytosanitary regulations, export subsidies, and price discrimination schemes
with pooling of returns to producers across markets or product type. These
policy interventions are likely to a¡ect the optimal advertising strategy.
Hence, we require a more elaborate model than those discussed above.
Although the general structure, ¢rst-order conditions, and solution forms are
essentially the same, regardless of the market situation, di¡erent market
structures and policies and funding mechanisms imply di¡erent market
clearing conditions and thus imply di¡erent speci¢c solutions for optimal
advertising. In every case, however, as for the simpler models, producer
bene¢ts from advertising arise only if the advertising raises the producer
price or average revenue.
In many industries that engage in generic advertising programs, for
instance, the £uid milk industries in individual states in Australia and the
United States, the relevant commodity market model would be the small-
country trade model, whether we were thinking in terms of trade with other
countries or with other states within the same country. That is, the state of
Victoria ought to be regarded as a price taker in the national and world
markets for milk. As our results above show, in a setting of competitive
markets and no policy interventions, advertising fresh milk could not be
pro¢table for Victoria. The possibility of privately pro¢table product adver-
tising is created through trade barriers that separate the Victorian £uid milk
market from the £uid milk markets in other states, and the manufacturing
milk market. Recent changes, that deregulated the milk markets in Australia,
might well have eliminated any such possibility. At a minimum these changes
imply that serious scrutiny should be given to the question of further generic
advertising of milk and dairy products in Australia.
In cases like this, when the potential for pro¢table advertising is entirely
a consequence of price policies that separate markets, the bene¢ts from
advertising and the producer optimum depend on how the impact of
advertising-induced demand growth is apportioned between price and
quantity changes, which depends on the details of the policy (e.g., see Alston
et al. 1994). To illustrate, take the case of home consumption price schemes
as originally modelled for dairy products by Parish (1962), and since applied
to many other products (e.g., see Alston and Freebairn 1988). Figure 4
describes the simplest case. A relatively high domestic price P
d is set for
home sales, with P
d greater than the world price P
w. For simplicity assume a
small country so that P
w is ¢xed, and further that P
d is predetermined.






d is domestic sales and Q is total
production.
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1 and the producer price and quantity outcome is
given by point d rather than point c. Producers receive additional gross
pro¢ts equal to area abdc, and optimal advertising would be at the point
where QdP
p=dA  1; that is, equation (7) but with the pool price P
p replacing
the competitive market price P.
In short, using more elaborate and realistic models of the determination
of market prices and quantities to re£ect government policy interventions,
the procedures of sections 2 and 3 can be extended readily to take into
account the e¡ects of various government policy interventions. Also, levy
funding of advertising and government subsidy funding can be added to the
model. Similar extensions can be used to incorporate elements of market
power behaviour, for example as modelled in Goddard and McCutcheon
(1993), Suzuki et al. (1994), and Zhang and Sexton (2000).
6. Multiple commodity effects
In some situations, the single-commodity, partial equilibrium model of
the preceding sections might miss important cross-commodity price and
advertising e¡ects and provide misleading estimates of the pro¢t-maximising
advertising level and levy rate. For example, advertising of one of the meats
(or fruits) may directly shift the demand curve for the other meats (or fruits).
Or, indirectly, the advertising-induced changes in prices of one meat (or
fruit) is likely to have cross-commodity e¡ects on the demand for and supply
of other meats (fruits), and a set of price feedback e¡ects following these
changes in turn have second-round e¡ects on market outcomes. These direct
Figure 4 Lump-sum funded advertising with a home consumption price scheme
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the realised pro¢t for the advertised meat (or fruit), and for the other meats
(fruits).
Cross-commodity price and advertising e¡ects can be captured in a
multiple product model, for example, for the meats, fruits, dairy products,
and so forth. Structural demand equations would include cross-commodity
prices and advertising variables as well as the own-price and advertising
variables. Structural supply equations similarly would include cross-
commodity prices. Piggott et al. (1995) provide a good example of the formal
modelling of cross-commodity price and advertising e¡ects to obtain total
derivatives of prices and quantities with respect to advertising. Kinnucan
(1996) and Kinnucan and Miao (2000) have used formal multiple commodity
models in considering the implications of cross-commodity e¡ects on
measures of the bene¢ts of advertising a particular product.
For the advertisers of a particular commodity for which there are cross-
commodity e¡ects, the second-round e¡ects may increase or decrease the
returns to advertising, and thus the optimal advertising expenditures. Both
the advertising-induced demand increase and the levy cost e¡ect give rise to
a higher price for the advertised product, which in turn gives rise to an
increase in the demand for substitute products and in their prices. Then,
indirectly, there will be a second-round increase in demand for the
advertised commodity; for complementary products the converse happens.
On the other hand, in the likely case where advertising of one commodity
directly reduces demand for substitute commodities and in turn their prices
fall, this line of causation will reduce the demand for the advertised
commodity and reduce the returns to its advertising. The net outcome of
these potential positive and negative direct and indirect second-round
e¡ects, and the magnitude of the full e¡ects relative to the ¢rst-round e¡ect
captured by the single-commodity model, become an empirical issue
depending on own- and cross-commodity elasticities of demand and supply
with respect to advertising and prices. Where advertising one commodity
has important direct and indirect cross-commodity e¡ects, the returns to
other commodity producers are also altered, but the direction of e¡ect is
ambiguous.
Discussion of the choice of pro¢t-maximising levels of advertising and
associated levy rates where there are important cross-commodity advertising
and price e¡ects raises a whole new set of issues related to strategic relations
by the di¡erent commodity decision makers. Here the returns to advertising
by one set of commodity producers depend on the advertising strategy
adopted by advertisers of other commodities. In essence, we enter the world
of strategic games between duopolists and oligopolists with control over
advertising, but with competitive or price-taking supply response behaviour.
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types of cooperative and noncooperative games. Alston et al. (2000) provide
some initial results along this line of analysis.
7. Some implications for econometric model specification
Use of the formulae summarised in table 1 to derive producer pro¢t-
maximising amounts of generic advertising imposes a number of restrictions
that might be treated as testable hypotheses in econometric models of the
demand response to advertising. In some senses the restrictions are more
binding than those required to make positive assessments of the e¡ects of
advertising, and many published econometric studies have not allowed for or
tested for some of the more subtle e¡ects of advertising. However, these
additional restrictions on parameters or elasticities to be used to derive
pro¢t-maximising levels of advertising add to the demands on data needed
for estimation.
The derivation of pro¢t-maximising advertising expenditures requires
estimates of a demand function that is consistent with diminishing marginal
returns to advertising. This means that the demand function, Q
d  fA;:::,
must be at least twice di¡erentiable in the advertising expenditure variable,
and that the second derivative must be negative.
14 Estimates of simple linear
functions of the form Q
d  a0  a1A, found in many studies do not meet this
requirement. Such functions can be used to test hypotheses that advertising
a¡ects sales, and to assess whether current advertising levels are pro¢table or
not, but they are not useful in determining the pro¢t-maximising advertising
level. Richer, but nevertheless parsimonious, functional forms that allow a
diminishing marginal sales response to advertising include Q  a0 ÿ a1=A,
Q  a0 ÿ a1Q=A, and Q  a0  a1 lnA, each of which is discussed and used in
estimation by Goddard and McCutcheon (1993). Several studies have used
variants of the square-root model: Q  a0  a1A
1=2. The logarithmic function
lnQ  a0  a1 lnA allows for a diminishing marginal return to advertising,
but it imposes a constant advertising elasticity. Alternatively, quadratic (and
even higher-order) advertising terms can be added to a linear function, such
as Q  a0  a1A ÿ a2A
2. Compared with the simpler models, the extra terms
require additional variation of advertising levels in the data if reliable
estimates are to be made.
In some cases, the transmission process from more advertising to higher
pro¢ts is via further di¡erentiation of the commodity and, in turn, a less
14General advertising response models sometimes posit zones of increasing returns to
advertising in addition to a zone of decreasing returns. Pro¢t maximisation requires that the
advertising expenditure be chosen in the zone of diminishing returns.
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e¡ect is achieved ö where the purpose of advertising is to position the
commodity more closely to a competitor, to increase the elasticity of demand
ö and discusses conditions when each strategy might be better). The shift
from D0 to D2 in ¢gure 1 provides an illustration. To test for this e¡ect of
advertising requires the inclusion of a cross-product term for price and
advertising (for example, not just Q  a ÿ bP  ..., but also as Q 
a ÿ bP  cPA  ...). Brester and Schroeder (1995), and several references
therein, include some speci¢cations of this nature and they ¢nd limited
empirical support for the idea that advertising reduces the price elasticity of
demand for some agricultural commodities. The addition of cross-price and
advertising explanatory variables adds to the required independent variation
of price and advertising in the data if signi¢cant e¡ects of advertising on
price elasticities are to be detected. In a world in which it is challenging to
obtain good and robust estimates of the direct e¡ects of advertising on the
position of the demand curve, it might be asking too much to try to measure
also the e¡ects on the slope of the curve, and the rates of change of these
responses with respect to the total advertising budget.
Among the econometric problems to be considered, issues of endogeneity
and simultaneity might be important when advertising is funded using levy
funds rather than lump-sum funding. Carman and Green (1993) discuss the
issue of `supply response to promotion'. In our derivations above, there is a
strict link between the levy-induced supply shifts and corresponding
advertising-induced demand shifts. In reality the statistical linkages may be
weakened by the di¡erences in timing between collection of funds and
expenditure or actual advertising, and the fact that some levy funds are
spent on other activities. It is su¤cient for now to note the potential for
such problems, and the fact that the funding method might play a role in
determining their importance.
The optimisation models might also be extended to allow for dynamic
e¡ects (for example, Nerlove and Arrow 1962).
15 Most of the recent econo-
metric studies of demand response to generic advertising have allowed for
persistence e¡ects, especially those studies using monthly or quarterly data.
It is common to see ¢ndings where advertising e¡ects persist for several
periods ö for instance, several quarters beyond the quarter in which the
advertising took place (or, at least, when the expenditure was made), even
for products like milk or meat for which intrinsic demand dynamics are not
15The models discussed in the article use single-period e¡ects of advertising. They readily
can be extended to include multiperiod e¡ects. Essentially, the partial advertising deriva-
tives, or advertising elasticities, would be represented by the discounted or present value of
the stream of current and future e¡ects of advertising.
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(such as wine), addiction (such as tobacco), or durability (such as woollen
apparel or cars). Estimates of the multiperiod e¡ects of advertising on
commodity demand require time-series or panel data sets for models with
current and lagged advertising variables as explanatory variables. Again, the
extra explanatory variables, even when supported by restrictions on lag
structures, add to the required independent variation of advertising outlays.
Of course, estimation of the e¡ects of advertising involves the usual long
list of speci¢cation, estimation and evaluation challenges. Attention needs to
be given to such factors as (1) allowing for the e¡ects of other explanatory
variables such as prices, incomes, and non-advertising demand-shift vari-
ables; (2) measurement of advertising; and (3) potential spurious correlations
from non-stationary dependent and explanatory variables. The volume by
Kinnucan et al. (1992) provides a review of some of the challenges and of
progress so far.
8. Conclusion
We have collated rules for the generic advertising expenditures that will
maximise producer quasi-rents or pro¢ts in a competitive commodity market
setting in which individual producers choose output quantities to equate their
marginal cost with the market price. A single-market, single-period model
can be generalised easily to allow for international trade, government policy
interventions, multiple commodity interactions, and to incorporate dynamic
and lagged responses of sales to advertising.
E¡ective advertising shifts out the commodity demand curve and also
may make demand less (or more) elastic. In order to raise producer pro¢ts,
advertising must cause the producer price to increase. In many instances this
outcome would not be possible without government intervention, the
imposition of price policies that allow markets to be separated and prevent
arbitrage from eliminating any advertising-induced price increases. This is
surely the case for state-level generic milk advertising programs, which are in
aggregate perhaps the most economically important generic commodity
advertising programs. The pro¢t-maximising advertising expenditure equates
marginal returns, given by the increase in average producer revenue (simply
price in the case of undistorted markets) times output, with the marginal cost
to producers of the advertising.
Four di¡erent methods of funding generic commodity advertising were
considered. Much of the literature focuses on lump-sum funding, however,
this seems more applicable to industries with market power than the com-
petitive industry structure considered in this article. Levies on producers
made compulsory by supporting government legislation are more common
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be equivalent at the pro¢t-maximising level of advertising. The levy
e¡ectively shifts the supply curve up, and a portion of the incidence is passed
on to buyers as higher prices; in contrast, under the lump-sum funding
option, costs of advertising are fully borne by producers. A fourth funding
option allows for a government subsidy or matching grant for producer
funds collected for advertising.
Generally, the e¡ects of the subsidy are to raise the pro¢t-maximising total
advertising budget and to lower the producer levy rate. In other words,
relative to the lump-sum funding option, the use of levies shifts some of the
marginal cost of advertising onto consumers, and the use of subsidies shifts
some of the marginal cost onto taxpayers, and both of these elements
make the advertising more pro¢table for producers; hence, their optimal
advertising expenditure is higher.
In our analysis of levy-funded advertising, we imposed a restriction that
the levy funds were fully spent on advertising in the same period in which the
funds were collected. This is a very strong link imposed between the fund-
raising and expenditure sides of the problem, which might not be matched
exactly in practice, even in the absence of matching government grants. In
practice, funds must be spent after they are raised (unless some kind of debt
¢nance is being used), some funds are spent in administration or on activities
other than advertising (including production research, market research,
market information, public relations, other forms of promotion), and some
funds are carried forward into future periods. This means that the linkage in
practice between taxing and spending is not as tight as we have formally
modelled, and the real-world situation might fall in some senses in between
lump-sum and levy funding as we have modelled them.
The advertising intensity, the advertising budget as a share of gross sales,
equals the ad valorem levy rate. At the pro¢t-maximising level of advertising
funded by a levy, a Dorfman^Steiner rule is found: the advertising intensity
and the levy rate are equal to the elasticity of quantity demanded with
respect to advertising divided by the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of
demand. Then, when the demand for a commodity is more responsive to
advertising, or less responsive to price, the price increase and bene¢ts to
producers from more advertising will be greater, and therefore so will the
optimal levy and the advertising budget be greater.
Application of the pro¢t-maximising advertising rules requires quantitative
information on the demand response to advertising and price, not just the
average impact multipliers or elasticities, but information on how those multi-
pliers and elasticities vary with the quantity of advertising. Diminishing
marginal returns to advertising is a necessary condition for de¢ning a maxi-
mum, and meeting this requirement places extra demands on the speci¢cation,
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equationneedstobetwice di¡erentiableintheadvertisingexplanatoryvariable,
and interaction terms between price and advertising are required if we wish to
testforadvertising-inducedchangesinthepriceelasticityorslopeofdemand.
Our results have some direct and indirect policy implications. We have
observed that generic advertising cannot pay in the small open-economy case
in the absence of government intervention in the market. This observation
raises questions about the future pro¢tablity, in a deregulated market, of the
types of generic milk promotion programs that have been important in
Australia to date. The US government has recently introduced a requirement
for regular assessment of the consequences of commodity promotion schemes
funded by mandatory levies, under federal marketing orders. Although we
do not yet have such requirements in Australia, it would seem reasonable to
introduce some conditions when mandatory levies are being collected to fund
generic advertising, sanctioned by the government. For instance, at a
minimum, we could require the organisation in question to collect data and
make it available, to permit an independent assessment of the e¡ects of the
advertising and the levy. This would improve the information £ow to
producers and to policy makers for future decision-making.
References
Ackerman, K.Z. and Henneberry, S.R. 1992, `Economic impacts of export market
promotion', in Armbruster, W.J. and Lenz, J.E. (eds), Commodity Promotion Policy in a
Global Economy, Proceedings of the NEC-63 Fall Symposium, Arlington, Virginia, 22^3
October 1991, pp. 46^59.
Alston, J.M., Carman, H.F. and Chalfant, J.A. 1994, `Evaluating primary product
promotion: the returns to generic advertising by a producer cooperative in a small, open
economy', in Goddard, E.W. and Taylor, D.S. (eds), Promotion in the Marketing Mix:
What Works and Why?, Proceedings from the NEC-63 Spring '94 Conference in Toronto,
Ontario, 28^9 April.
Alston, J.M., Carman, H.F., Chalfant, J.A., Crespi, J., Sexton, R.J. and Venner, R.S.
1998, The California Prune Board's Promotion Program: An Evaluation, Giannini
Foundation Research Report No. 344, University of California, Davis, California.
Alston, J.M. and Freebairn, J.W. 1988, `Producer price equalization', Review of Marketing
and Agricultural Economics, vol. 56, pp. 306^39.
Alston, J.M., Freebairn, J.W. and James, J.S. 2000, `Beggar thy neighbour advertising:
theory and application to generic commodity promotion programs', mimeo, University
of California, Davis.
Brester, G. and Schroeder, T. 1995, `The impacts of brand and generic advertising on meat
demand', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 77, pp. 969^79.
Carman, H.F. and Green, R.D. 1993, `Commodity supply response to a producer-¢nanced
advertising program', Agribusiness, vol. 9, pp. 605^21.
Chang, H.-S. and Kinnucan, H.W. 1991, `Economic e¡ects of an advertising excise tax',
Agribusiness, vol. 7, pp. 165^73.
Generic advertising without supply control 143
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001Cran¢eld, J. and Goddard, E. 1999, `Open economy and processor oligopoly power e¡ects
of beef advertising in Canada', Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 47,
pp. 1^9.
De Boer, J. 1997, `Rural product promotion: economic aspects of promotability,
organisation and public assistance', Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics,
vol. 45, pp. 121^45.
Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P. 1954, `Optimal advertising and optimal quality', American
Economic Review, vol. 44, pp. 826^36.
Forker, O. and Ward, R. 1993, Commodity Advertising: The Economics and Measurement
of Generic Programs, Lexington, New York.
Goddard, E.W. and Conboy, P. 1993, `Optimal international promotion expenditure for
di¡erentiated products', Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, vol. 61,
pp. 49^61.
Goddard, E.W. and McCutcheon, M. 1993, `Optimal producer investment in generic
advertising: the case of £uid milk in Ontario and Quebec', Canadian Journal of
Agricultural Economics, vol. 41, pp. 329^47.
Goddard, E.W. and Tielu, A. 1988, `Assessing the e¡ectiveness of milk advertising in
Ontario', Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 36, pp. 261^78.
Godden, D. 1997, Agricultural and Resource Policy: Principles and Practice, Oxford
University Press, Melbourne.
Hayes, D.J. and Jensen, H.H. 1992, `Generic advertising without supply control:
implications of mandatory assessments', in Armbruster, W.J. and Lenz, J.E. (eds),
Commodity Promotion Policy in a Global Economy, proceedings of the NEC-63 Fall
Symposium, Arlington, Virginia, 22^3 October 1991, pp. 90^104.
Hill, D., Piggott, R. and Gri¤th, G. 1996, `Pro¢tability of incremental expenditure on ¢bre
promotion', Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 40, pp. 151^74.
Industries Assistance Commission 1976, Financing Promotion of Rural Products, AGPS,
Canberra.
Kinnucan, H.W. 1996, `A note on measuring returns to generic advertising in interrelated
markets', Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 47, pp. 261^7.
Kinnucan, H.W. 1997, `Middleman behaviour and generic advertising rents in competitive
interrelated industries', Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
vol. 41, pp. 191^207.
Kinnucan, H.W. 1999a, `Advertising traded goods', Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, vol. 24, pp. 38^56.
Kinnucan, H.W. 1999b, `Optimal generic advertising decisions in supply-managed
industries: clari¢cation and some further results', Canadian Journal of Agricultural
Economics, vol. 47, pp. 157^66.
Kinnucan, H.W., Chang, H.-S. and Venkateswaran, M. 1993, `Generic advertising wearout',
Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, vol. 61, pp. 401^15.
Kinnucan, H.W. and Christian, J.E. 1997, `A method for measuring returns to nonprice
export promotion with application to almonds', Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, vol. 22, pp. 120^32.
Kinnucan, H.W. and Miao, Y. 2000, `Distributional impacts of generic advertising on
related commodity markets', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 82,
pp. 672^8.
Kinnucan, H.W. and Myrland, Ò. 2000, `Optimal advertising levies with application to the
Norway-EU Salmon Agreement', European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 27,
pp. 39^57.
144 J.W. Freebairn and J.M. Alston
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001Kinnucan, H.W., Thompson, S. and Chang, H.-S. (eds) 1992, Commodity Advertising and
Promotion, Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa.
Lambin, J.J. 1976, Advertising, Competition and Market Conduct in Oligopoly over Time,
Amsterdam, North-Holland.
Nerlove, M. and Arrow, K. 1962, `Optimal advertising policy under dynamic conditions',
Economica, vol. 29, pp. 129^47.
Nerlove, M. and Waugh, F. 1961, `Advertising without supply control: some implications
of a study of the advertising of oranges', Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 43,
pp. 813^37.
Nichols, J.P., Kinnucan, H.W. and Ackerman, K.Z. (eds) 1991, Economic E¡ects of Generic
Promotion Programs for Agricultural Exports, proceedings of the NEC-63 Spring
Symposium, Washington, DC, 22^3 February 1990.
Parish, R. 1962, `The costs of protecting the dairy industry', Economic Record, vol. 82,
pp. 167^82.
Piggott, R., Piggott, N. and Wright, V. 1995, `Approximating returns to incremental
advertising expenditures: methods and applications to the Australian meat industry',
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 77, pp. 497^511.
Quilkey, J. 1986, `Promotion of primary products ö a view from the cloister', Australian
Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 30, pp. 38^52.
Suzuki, N., Kaiser, H.M., Lenz, J.E., Kobayashi, K. and Forker, O.D. 1994, `Evaluating
generic milk promotion e¡ectiveness with an imperfect competition model', American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 76, pp. 296^302.
Vande Kamp, P. and Kaiser, H. 1999, Commodity Promotion Programs in the United States,
Department of Agricultural, Resource and Managerial Economics, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY, May.
Wohlgenant, M. 1993, `Distribution of gains from research and promotion in multistage
production systems: the case of US beef and pork industries', American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, vol. 75, pp. 642 ^51.
Zhang, M. and Sexton, R.J. 2000, `Optimal commodity promotion in imperfectly
competitive markets', mimeo, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of California, Davis.
Generic advertising without supply control 145
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001